



United Nations Security Council

Addressing The Sudanese Crisis

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Mandate and Special Provisions:

The United Nations was created following the horrors of WWII in 1945, and the Security Council was subsequently created to protect the peace and security of the people and to prevent a third World War. It came into its first session on 17th January, 1946. The Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was set under Article 24 of the UN Charter.

The council is reflective of the International Community's conduct of responding to threats to peace and security of civilians and attacks on global stability. The Security council retains the power of making decisions that all countries must follow, in essence making it a legally binding committee. This power is only held by the Security Council, which makes it distinct from the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, who can only produce recommendations and do not hold such power. Article 25 obliges all 193 members to accept and carry out the decisions put forward by this Council.

Five hold permanent seats with veto power which are; China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. Ten are elected to two-year terms. A substantive resolution needs nine affirmative votes and no veto. This committee will convene as the Council of 2026, with Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Pakistan, Panama and Somalia in the elected seats.

However, special provisions at RIVYMUN IV this year will be allowing 15 extra states to ensure coherent and productive debate on the given topic. This does not mean that the set voting procedure will be affected. The right to vote under Article 27(1) or Provisional Rule of Procedure, will only be reserved for the 10 non permanent and 5 permanent members of this council. In accordance with rule 37 and 38 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, UN member states that are not members of the Security Council may participate in discussions **“without vote”** and that non-members may propose and draft resolutions at the formal request of an actual Security Council Member. In this case, this approval has been provided by the Secretary General of this conference.

Consequently, the following states will also be included within the committee:

The State of Palestine, Israel, Sudan, Venezuela, Germany, Canada, Brazil, Japan., India, Italy, Ukraine, South Africa, Morocco, Oman and Qatar. These states will not have a voting status for the Draft Resolutions presented within the Security Council.



Key terminologies and Definitions

1. Genocide

Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. In Sudan, alleged against RSF and allied militias targeting non-Arab groups.

2. Crimes Against Humanity

A widespread or systematic attack against civilians, including murder, extermination, rape, and persecution. No genocidal intent required. UN bodies say RSF conduct may qualify.

3. War Crimes

Serious violations of international humanitarian law in armed conflict, such as willful killing, indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, and starvation. Both parties in Sudan have been accused.

4. Chapter VII of the UN Charter

Legal basis for UNSC action on threats to peace and security. Allows Article 39 determinations, Article 41 sanctions, and Article 42 military action. Used for Sudan.

5. Arms Embargo

A UNSC sanction under Article 41 banning arms supply, sale, or transfer to specified actors. First imposed on Darfur non-state actors in 2004 and later expanded.

6. Targeted Sanctions

UNSC measures such as travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes on designated individuals or entities. Part of the Sudan sanctions regime.

7. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

A 2005 commitment to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. State has primary duty; UNSC can act if it fails. Invoked for Sudan/Darfur.

8. ICC Referral

UNSC power to refer a non-party state situation to the International Criminal Court. Resolution 1593 (2005) referred Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC.

9. Siege-Like Tactics

Encirclement or blockade cutting civilians off from food, water, and medicine. Can violate IHL and amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Seen in El Fasher and Zamzam.

10. Collective Punishment

Punishing a group for acts of individuals, prohibited by IHL. Can be a war crime or crime against humanity. Reported against communities in Sudan based on ethnicity or alleged allegiance.



Historical Background

Colonial Legacy & First Civil War (1955-1972): Sudan gained independence from British-Egyptian rule in 1956. However, the seeds of conflict were sown during the colonial era, where power and resources were concentrated in the northern Nile Valley, neglecting the southern and western peripheries. This marginalization led to the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), where southern rebels (the Anyanya movement) fought against the northern-dominated government. The war ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, which granted the south a degree of self-governance.

Second Civil War & The Rise of al-Bashir (1983-2005): The peace was short-lived. In 1983, President Gaafar Nimeiry's decision to impose Islamic law reignited tensions, leading to the Second Sudanese Civil War. This conflict pitted the government against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by John Garang, who fought for self-determination for Southern Sudan and control over resources, including newly discovered oil. In 1989, Omar al-Bashir seized power in a coup, intensifying the war with a brutal Islamist agenda. The conflict lasted 22 years and claimed over 2 million lives.

The Darfur Genocide (2003–Present): As the Second Civil War raged, a new crisis erupted in Sudan's western region of Darfur in 2003. Non-Arab rebel groups (the SLA and JEM) took up arms, citing chronic neglect and marginalization by Khartoum. In response, the al-Bashir government unleashed the Janjaweed, a nomadic Arab militia, in a campaign of mass atrocities. The International Criminal Court (ICC) eventually charged al-Bashir with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for the killing of an estimated 300,000 people and the displacement of over 2 million.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement & South Sudan (2005–2011): The Second Civil War officially ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, signed by the government and the SPLM/A. The CPA granted Southern Sudan the right to self-determination, leading to a referendum in 2011 where the south voted overwhelmingly for independence. South Sudan became the world's newest nation, but the root causes of conflict such as marginalization, resource disputes, and power struggles, remained unresolved in Sudan.

The 2019 Revolution & The Fragile Transition: In December 2018, mass protests erupted against al-Bashir's 30-year rule, driven by economic collapse and demands

for democratic change. In April 2019, the military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF) and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti" (RSF), ousted al-Bashir. A power-sharing agreement was reached between the military and civilian groups, but it was fragile. In October 2021, the military staged another coup, derailing the transition to democracy.

The Current Civil War (April 2023–Present): The current war began on April 15, 2023, when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum. The conflict was triggered by a power struggle over the planned integration of the RSF into the regular army. The RSF quickly seized much of Khartoum and Darfur, while the SAF regrouped and launched counter-offensives. The war has created the world's largest humanitarian crisis, with over 11 million people displaced and widespread famine.

Causes of the crisis:

Colonial Legacy & Structural Marginalization: The colonial administration in Sudan built a highly centralized state that concentrated political authority, economic investment, and public services in the Nile Valley core. Peripheral regions, especially the south, Darfur, and the Nuba Mountains, were governed through indirect rule, neglect, and coercive control, leaving them with weak infrastructure, few schools or hospitals, and almost no representation in national institutions. After independence, successive Khartoum-based governments inherited and reinforced this unequal system. Land alienation, unequal access to grazing and water, and the manipulation of local leaders deepened grievances. These structural inequalities did not by themselves cause the current war, but they created a fragile state in which armed groups could mobilize marginalized communities, and in which competition over resources and belonging could easily escalate into national conflict.

The Immediate Political Trigger: The April 2023 war erupted from a violent power struggle between two generals who had jointly governed Sudan since the 2021 coup. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel

Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," had a fragile partnership. The specific dispute was an internationally backed framework agreement to reform the military and integrate the RSF into the regular army. Disagreements over the timetable and terms of integration crystallized a broader fight for control of the state and its economic networks.

Economic Drivers: Gold, Oil, and Resources: Control over Sudan's natural resources has been a central driver. Gold is the most significant income source for warring parties, with the RSF using gold production and exports to secure military support. By 2023, about 57 percent of Sudan's gold production was smuggled out, fueling the conflict. Oil remains strategically important, especially as a transit route for South Sudan's exports. Fertile farmland and the Red Sea coastline have attracted intense external interest, with Gulf countries investing heavily. These resources and strategic routes are key drivers, not background factors.

Ethnic and Identity Dimensions: The conflict has a pronounced ethnic dimension, particularly in Darfur. The RSF evolved from the Janjaweed militias, notorious for ethnic cleansing in the 2000s. In West Darfur, ethnic

attacks targeting Masalit communities have been documented, with the RSF following an Arab supremacist ideology seeking to push non-Arabs out. Darfur is divided between non-Arab African communities (Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa) and Arab groups. The weaponization of tribal identity and repeated displacement have reignited ethnic fractures in the current war.

External and Geopolitical Factors: The Sudan conflict is heavily internationalized, with external actors fueling violence through arms, economic interests, and geopolitical competition. The SAF has been backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, while the RSF relies on patronage from the United Arab Emirates. Russia, through Wagner Group and later Africa Corps, has sought to entrench itself in mining, especially gold, and cooperated with the UAE in supporting Hemedti. This external interference turns the conflict into a proxy battleground for control of Sudan's territory, resources, and waterways.

Need to stop the problem

Duration of the Conflict: The current war began on April 15, 2023, when fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum. It has now entered its fourth year, with no resolution in sight. This is not a new conflict, however, it is the latest chapter in a cycle of violence that stretches back to before Sudan's independence in 1956, including two civil wars and the Darfur genocide. The current phase alone has outlasted multiple ceasefire agreements, the 2021 coup, and the 2019 revolution. Diplomatic efforts have failed to produce a lasting pause, and the war has become protracted, with both sides entrenched and foreign backers sustaining the fight. Every month it continues, the damage deepens and the path to peace grows longer.

Casualties and Human Cost: The true death toll remains impossible to pin down, but estimates range from 61,000 to hundreds of thousands, with some analysts putting it between 150,000 and 400,000 or more. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 52,904 combined civilian and combatant fatalities as of June 2026. Sudan's Ministry of Health reported around

33,000 deaths recorded in hospitals as of January 2026, a figure that excludes those who died outside medical facilities. The UN documented at least 11,300 civilian deaths in 2025 alone, nearly triple the number in 2024. In the first half of 2026, around 1,400 civilian deaths were documented, including 1,100 killed by drone strikes, which accounted for more than 80 percent of all documented conflict-related civilian deaths in that period. The healthcare system has largely collapsed, with about 37 percent of health facilities out of service, and cholera has spread to all 18 states, with over 113,000 cases and 3,000 deaths since 2024. More than 200 attacks on healthcare facilities have been verified since the war began, causing over 2,000 deaths. All fatality figures are assessed by the sources as undercounts.

Displacement: Sudan is facing the world's largest displacement crisis. As of December 2025, approximately 14 million people had been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began, of whom nearly 12 million remain displaced. This includes 7.1 million internally displaced people within Sudan and 4.4 million refugees who have sought safety in the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, and Uganda. Roughly one in four Sudanese has been uprooted. Over 3 million displaced people and refugees returned to their home

areas between January and 2025, but many returned due to hardship in asylum countries rather than improved safety.

Food Insecurity and Famine: Nearly 19.5 million people, two out of every five Sudanese, are facing crisis levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). Close to 135,000 people are facing catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) across 14 hotspots in Darfur, South Darfur, and South Kordofan, with famine conditions confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli. An estimated 825,000 children under five are expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2026, a 7 percent increase compared to 2025 and 25 percent higher than pre-conflict levels. Around 40 percent of health facilities are non-functional, 17 million people lack access to safe drinking water, and 24 million lack adequate sanitation.

Risk of Regional Escalation: The UN Security Council has warned that Sudan's escalating and increasingly internationalized conflict risks spilling over into neighboring countries, including Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. The war has shifted toward Sudan's Kordofan region, with the RSF capturing Babanusa on December 1 and the Heglig oil field on December 8, 2025, while major cities in South Kordofan remain under siege. The

movement of armed groups across borders carries "potentially destabilizing effects" for the wider region. Independent analysts have cautioned that the conflict has evolved into a fully internationalized war sustained by cross-border arms, financial, and political networks, and that these same networks could fuel new conflicts in Chad, South Sudan, or Ethiopia.



Past United Nations Actions pertaining to the problem

1. Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004)

Adopted on 30 July 2004, this was the Security Council's first major response to the crisis in Darfur. It imposed an immediate arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed militias, operating in the three Darfur states of North, South, and West Darfur. The resolution also demanded that the Sudanese Government disarm the Janjaweed within 30 days and apprehend their leaders, threatening economic sanctions if it failed to comply.

2. Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005)

Adopted on 31 March 2005, this resolution was a landmark moment, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Because Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, this referral was the only way to grant the ICC jurisdiction. The resolution obligated Sudan to "cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor". The referral led directly to arrest warrants for senior Sudanese

officials, including former Minister of State for the Interior Ahmad Harun, Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb, and ultimately President Omar al-Bashir.

3. Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005)

Adopted on 29 March 2005, this resolution broadened the arms embargo to include not just non-governmental entities but all parties to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur. Critically, it also established a Security Council Sanctions Committee and imposed two additional measures: a travel ban and an asset freeze on individuals designated by the Committee as impeding peace, violating international humanitarian law, or committing atrocities. It further created a Panel of Experts to monitor implementation and identify potential designees. Every subsequent renewal (including those in 2023, 2024, and 2025) builds directly on Resolution 1591.

4. UNITAMS (2020-2023)

Established by Resolution 2524 in June 2020, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) was a political mission designed to support Sudan's transition to democratic governance, assist with peace processes, and coordinate humanitarian aid. However, following the outbreak of civil war in April 2023, the Sudanese government requested its

termination. On 1 December 2023, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2715 (2023), terminating UNITAMS' mandate effective 3 December 2023 and initiating a three-month wind-down. The resolution passed 14 votes in favour with one abstention (Russia).

5. Security Council Resolution 2736 (2024)

Adopted on 13 June 2024, this resolution directly addressed the RSF's siege of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and a critical humanitarian hub. It demanded that the Rapid Support Forces halt the siege and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and de-escalation in and around the city, where famine and extreme food insecurity were threatening to spread. The resolution was significant because it named the RSF explicitly and framed the siege as a direct threat to civilian survival. However, as subsequent Security Council press statements have noted, the RSF has failed to implement its provisions, and the siege has continued.

6. Security Council Resolution 2750 (2024)

Adopted on 11 September 2024, this resolution renewed the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime—including targeted sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) and the Darfur arms embargo—until 12 September 2025. The renewal was unanimous, reflecting continued (if fragile) Council consensus on the need to maintain pressure. The

resolution is important because it demonstrates that despite deep divisions over how to address the crisis, the Security Council has been able to preserve the existing sanctions architecture.



Relevant Regional Case Studies

South Sudan (2013–present):

South Sudan's civil war led the UNSC to establish targeted sanctions through Resolution 2206 (2015) and a territorial arms embargo through Resolution 2428 (2018), supported by a Panel of Experts and repeatedly renewed through 2026. Enforcement has been weak, with documented violations such as Uganda's 2025 arms transfers without a sanctions exemption, showing that regional states can undermine an embargo. Its relevance to Sudan is that it models a nationwide/territorial arms embargo.

Libya (2011):

Libya's 2011 uprising produced Resolution 1970, which uniquely combined an ICC referral with an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze, followed by Resolution 1973 authorizing "all necessary means" and a NATO-led intervention. The ICC indicted Qaddafi, Saif al-Islam, and al-Senoussi, but the intervention toppled the regime without producing stability.

Social Effects

1. Mass Displacement

Sudan is now the world's largest displacement crisis, with more than 11.3 million people forcibly displaced since April 2023, 6.4 million internally and over 3.5 million across borders. By late 2025, an estimated 12.8 million remained displaced: 9.1 million IDPs and 3.6 million refugees. In September 2026, over 400 people a day crossed into eastern Chad, roughly 20 times the previous daily rate. In Chad, over 190,000 refugees live in dire conditions, with 31,000 families lacking adequate shelter and most surviving on less than half the minimum daily water requirement. Women and girls arriving there have reported kidnapping and rape during their journeys.

2. Famine and Catastrophic Food Insecurity

Famine was officially classified in Zamzam camp, North Darfur, in August 2024, the first confirmed famine globally in over seven years. Today, 24.6 million people face acute food insecurity, an increase of 3.5 million since June 2024: 15.9 million in Crisis (Phase 3), 8.1 million in Emergency (Phase 4), and over 637,000 in Catastrophe (Phase 5). Famine has been confirmed in 10 locations. At least 40 community kitchens in Zamzam closed in early 2025, cutting off a lifeline. The 2023/24 harvest of

sorghum, millet, and wheat fell by 46 percent, enough to have fed 18 million people for a year, at an economic loss of \$1.3–1.7 billion.

3. Gender-Based Violence as a Weapon of War

In 2025, the UN documented over 500 victims of sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, sexual torture, and slavery. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk stated: "The bodies of Sudanese women and girls have been weaponized to terrorize communities." Between January 2024 and November 2025, Médecins Sans Frontières cared for 3,396 survivors in North and South Darfur; 97 percent were women and girls. Nearly all in North Darfur and over two-thirds in South Darfur were assaulted by armed individuals. One women's rights group documented 1,300 cases, with rape in over three-quarters and 225 involving children as young as four

4. Collapse of the Healthcare System

Sudan's healthcare system has been systematically dismantled. In 2025 alone, WHO verified 65 attacks on health facilities and personnel, causing over 1,620 deaths and 276 injuries i.e 82 percent of all global deaths from such attacks that year. One attack on Al-Mujlad Hospital in West Kordofan killed more than 40 people, many health workers and children. Since April 2023, over 150 attacks have been verified, with 318 health workers killed and 273

injured. Vaccination and disease surveillance have collapsed. MSF treated over 12,000 measles patients and nearly 42,200 cholera patients in 2025. More than 15,000 children under five were admitted for acute malnutrition

5. Education Collapse – A Lost Generation

Sudan faces one of the world's most critical education emergencies. Over 10,000 schools are closed, and 2,100 are shelters for displaced people, leaving over 14 million children out of formal schooling. Save the Children calls it the world's longest school closure, lasting 484 days, with more than eight million children missing roughly 500 days of education. By early 2025, over a million students had missed critical exams. UNICEF has tried to reach children through Safe Learning Spaces and digital learning, but insecurity, teacher displacement, and access restrictions continue to hamper delivery.

6. Ethnic and Social Fragmentation

The RSF and allied militias have carried out mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and widespread sexual violence against non-Arab communities, particularly the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa. The fall of El Fasher on 26 October 2025, after a 540-day siege, was followed by reported atrocities; over 2,000 civilians—mostly non-Arab—were killed in the first days. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed grave concern over dehumanizing language, hate speech, and ethnically

motivated violations targeting these communities. It documented killings, torture, summary executions, arbitrary detention, systematic rape, attacks on healthcare, and aid blockades. The RSF's campaign mirrors earlier atrocities in El Geneina and Ardamata. The UN has warned of a "foreseeable probability" of genocide in Sudan.



Economic Effects

1. Catastrophic GDP Contraction

Sudan's economy has suffered one of the world's most severe contractions, with real GDP falling by nearly 40 percent between 2022 and 2024. The economy has been set back by more than 30 years, and if the conflict continues to 2030, extreme poverty could exceed 60 percent by 2043. Even with peace restored in 2026, cumulative GDP losses could still reach \$18.8 billion by 2043.

2. Fiscal Collapse and Debt Crisis

Government revenues have collapsed from around 10 percent of GDP to under 5 percent, leaving the state with almost no capacity to fund basic services. Military and security spending consumes roughly 90 percent of the national budget, while health and education receive a tiny fraction. External debt stands at approximately \$56 billion, and a Paris Club debt relief deal worth \$14.1 billion remains suspended.

3. Trade Disruption and Supply Chain Collapse

Insecurity, drone strikes, and interruptions to roads and ports have repeatedly broken market and trade routes, causing shortages of essential goods and limiting cash

access. Supply chains are severely disrupted, staple availability is atypical, and the banking collapse has forced Sudan to rely heavily on imports from neighbouring countries, further weakening local production.

4. Banking Collapse, Currency Depreciation, and Hyperinflation

The banking system has effectively collapsed: many branches have been destroyed, deposits looted, and electronic transfers halted. The Sudanese pound has lost over 80 percent of its value, with the parallel-market rate soaring from around 560 SDG/USD to over 4,250 SDG/USD. Inflation reached 170 percent in 2024 and remains extremely high, erasing household purchasing power.

5. Mass Unemployment and Soaring Poverty

Unemployment has jumped from 32 percent in 2022 to 47 percent in 2024, with projections around 60 percent for 2025 and an estimated 4.6 million jobs lost. Poverty has risen from 36 percent before the war to 71 percent, leaving about 23 million people poor. Many agricultural households report lost income and employment opportunities.

Political Effects

1. Threat to Sudan's Sovereignty, Unity, and Territorial Integrity

Sudan's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity have been consistently reaffirmed as non-negotiable. The RSF's announcement of a parallel governing authority was rejected as a direct threat to unity, with concern that it could fragment the country and worsen the conflict. Egypt has warned that any breach of these red lines would threaten its own national security, showing how Sudan's internal fragmentation carries immediate regional consequences.

2. Regional Spillover and Proxy Conflict

The conflict has become internationalized, with cross-border strikes and military movements near Chad and Ethiopia raising fears of regional war. Fighting risks spilling into Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, and has been characterized as a threat to regional peace and stability. Chad closed its border after drone strikes killed civilians on its territory. Analysts warn the region could be dragged into a spiral of violence, with Chad and South Sudan most exposed.

3. External Interference and the Arming of Belligerents

Grave concern has been expressed over external interference fueling the conflict, and all Member States have been urged to comply with international law. A UN Fact-Finding Mission found reasonable grounds that a transnational network supplied the RSF with weapons, logistics, and foreign personnel, with links to the United Arab Emirates. Foreign-supplied drones have also expanded the SAF's strike capabilities. This external arming sustains the fighting and entrenches proxy dynamics.

4. Fragmented Mediation and No Coherent Political Process

Negotiation efforts remain split across the African Union, IGAD, and Gulf states, with US-led and regional initiatives making little progress. Sudan's leadership insists there can be no truce without RSF withdrawal and weapons consolidation, complicating talks. Support continues for the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Ramtane Lamamra, but the lack of a unified mediation architecture remains a critical obstacle.

5. The Arms Embargo as Contested Leverage

The Council is divided over expanding the arms embargo beyond Darfur to cover all of Sudan. The United States pushes for a nationwide embargo, Russia firmly rejects it, and the UK backs strengthening the sanctions regime. China warns that expansion could worsen the humanitarian situation and fragment Sudan. This debate reflects a deeper contest over whether to prioritize coercive measures or respect Sudanese sovereignty.



Bloc Dynamics

Western Powers(P3)and Like-Minded States

The US, UK, and France push to extend the Darfur arms embargo across all of Sudan. They argue external weapons sustain both the SAF and RSF and want to target drone suppliers and procurement networks. They face resistance from Sudan, which calls the expansion an attack on its self-defence. The Quartet groups the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates in a separate mediation track may also align. It has agreed in principle to halt foreign military support to both sides, but Sudan's government refuses to cooperate.

Russia and China

Russia and China resist expanding the embargo and back Sudan's sovereignty claims. Russia has vowed to block any broadening, calling it unacceptable to treat both parties as equally responsible. China warns expansion could worsen the humanitarian situation and fragment Sudan. These two powers alongside the support of the African and Middle Eastern Nations that follow provided initiatives.

African States

The A3, currently DRC, Liberia, and Somalia, rejects sanctions as pressure on warring factions. They back the African Union line for a ceasefire and a Sudanese-led political solution. They argue embargoes mostly hurt civilians while warmongers evade them through proxies.

The UAE as an External Actor

The UAE is outside the formal Council but shapes its dynamics and has blocked referral of a UN report to the 1591 Sanctions Committee. It is accused of violating the Darfur embargo by arming the RSF through Chad and Libya. This complicates the P3 push, since a Western-aligned state is a key alleged violator while Russia and China use sovereignty to shield the SAF.

The Elected 10

The E10 comprises all ten elected, non-permanent members of the Council. Historically fragmented, they are increasingly coordinating as a group, jointly drafting resolutions and acting as an agenda-setting force rather than simply following the P5's lead. On the issue of Sudan, their collective weight matters because nine votes are required for a resolution to pass, giving a coordinated E10 an effective veto.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer

I. How should the Council enforce the existing arms embargo on Darfur (Resolution 1591) to stop the flow of advanced weapons, drones, and mercenaries to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other armed groups, as documented by the Panel of Experts?

II. How can the Council ensure that the mandate and reporting of the Panel of Experts are strengthened to effectively monitor and investigate violations of the sanctions regime, including the use of new technologies like drones?

III. To what extent should the Council condemn and act against external states whose military support to the warring parties constitutes a violation of the arms embargo and a threat to regional stability?

IV. What steps should the Council take to compel the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF to immediately and fully implement a durable ceasefire, given the repeated failure of past agreements like the Jeddah Declaration?

V. How should the Council address the systematic obstruction of humanitarian access by the warring parties, particularly the sieges and attacks on civilian infrastructure and personnel, to ensure the delivery of aid to the over 30 million people in need?

VI. What role should the Council play in supporting accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including by referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court and demanding cooperation with its investigations?

VII. How can the Council support and coordinate with regional mediation efforts, such as those by the African Union and IGAD, to create a unified international front for a political solution to the conflict?

VIII. What measures should be taken to address the widespread displacement of over 10 million people, including the specific vulnerabilities of women and children, and to ensure their protection and access to basic services?

IX. How should the Council address the link between the conflict and the risk of famine, which has been confirmed in parts of Darfur and Kordofan, to prevent a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe?

X. What mechanisms should be established to monitor, report, and verify ceasefire violations and human rights abuses, ensuring that the findings are used to inform further Council action?

XI. How can the Council use its Chapter VII powers to ensure compliance with its decisions, including considering the imposition of further, more robust sanctions on individuals and entities that obstruct peace and humanitarian access?

XII. What benchmarks should the Council set for the phased adjustment or lifting of sanctions in response to verifiable progress by the parties on key issues, including the cessation of hostilities, disarmament, and a political transition?